People’s Republic of Spiritual Rednecks

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“Trump wins!” At 1pm, November 9, Beijing time, hours before mainstream US media could confidently call the 2016 US presidential election for Trump, eager Chinese spectators handed Trump the presidency using what seems like a photoshopped screenshot of Wolf Blitzer on CNN. The picture might be fake, but the sentiment is all too real: the insuppressible excitement for a Trump upset, or, more accurately, for the defeat of Hillary Clinton.

By now, many who watch China have come to the realization that Donald Trump has a “base” in a country one Pacific Ocean away from where ballots are actually cast. Articles have been written about the phenomenon, with a mixture of amusement and alarm. Understanding Trump’s appeal in China will have limited bearing on how the president-elect conducts his business, but will shed light on the cultural and political propensities of a vocal segment of the Chinese society today.  The Trump fanfare in China embodies an interesting contradiction: outward-looking, intellectually curious Chinese individuals embracing an American strongman who builds his political brand on xenophobia and ignorance.

Why would well-educated, internet savvy Chinese, whom economists consider one of the biggest beneficiaries of the past quarter century of globalization, identify with the vengeful, explosive hero of those who have been left behind by that same historical process?

The Chinese Internet has taken a particular interest in Trump’s unexpected ascension as soon as it became clear that he would be the Republican nominee. At that time, popular Chinese posts about Trump depict him as a symptom of the ailments of American society. He is the manifestation of people’s hidden frustration with political correctness, of the cleavage between intellectual elites and those struggling with their livelihoods, and of “our mediocre and shallow time where entertainment trumps everything.” While there is this you-reap-what-you-sow sentiment in such articles, there is also no doubt that Trump is an ignorant, inexperienced and intolerant hot-head who is clearly unfit for the job.

It is hard to pinpoint exactly when a much more favorable view about Trump starts to bloom in the Chinese cyberspace. Through that lens, he is viewed as a truth-talker, a pragmatist, a fixer, and most importantly, a strong counter-voice against what is believed decadent Western liberal values.

Before we can properly explore the “Chinese support for Trump”, it is important to separate it from Chinese Americans’ rooting for the Republican candidate, which is based on more substantive issues for people who actually live in the US. A considerable amount of what’s written on Chinese-language sites about the election is actually by Chinese Americans, especially first generation Chinese immigrants. Their opposition to Hillary, and Democrats in general, often centers around issues such as the Affirmative Action which is believed to hurt hard-working Chinese American kids. This topic deserves a separate treatment, for which the Sinica Podcast’s Kaiser Kuo did a great job.

There are, of course, substantive reasons for a mainland Chinese to prefer a Trump presidency. A typical response can be found in comments made by military observers and geopolitical types on the Chinese Internet, who see a US under Trump’s leadership set to make “strategic contractions” overseas given his openly isolationist positions and a focus on domestic economic issues. “The US will almost certainly move away from its strategy of Pivot to Asia. It will give up on the South China Sea, or even its influence in Taiwan. Trump is a pragmatic businessman. Confronting China in the South China Sea is a business with a low cost-benefit ratio that he won’t do.” This is probably wishful thinking bordering on fantasy, given Trump’s multiple policy backtracks days after his election. But it does account for why some in China are gleeful about a Trump win.

On the substantive side, there are also veteran Chinese political and economic commentators who express doubts about the potential benefits of the “Trump doctrine”, albeit much more muted than the geopolitical optimists. They argue that China, as one of the largest beneficiaries of globalization, will suffer if the US sways momentously back towards protectionism.

But as we shall see, self-interest seems not to be the primary component of the Chinese affection for Trump. Their fondness of this man is as much value-based as those American voters believed to have voted “against their own interest”. After the election, Routangseng, one of the consistently pro-Trump figure on Weibo, wrote about Trump, as “the true heir of Edmund Burke and John Locke”, relentlessly defending the last bastion of freedom. The comparison is absurd, if not outright hilarious. But the rest of his argument, that high-tax welfare states are fostering a sense of entitlement and are nothing more than “open robbery”, sounds all too familiar to ears weathered by American political rhetoric. And he is not alone in his hostility toward what he labels the evil social programs of “white liberals”(白左). In fact, “white liberals” has become a keyword that tags in much of the Chinese online discussion about the election.

The unveiled, intense disdain for American (and European) liberals demonstrated by a substantial segment of the Chinese social media is the key to understanding Trump’s popularity here, and something that ties the “intellectual” side of Trump’s Chinese support with his apparent lack of any intellectual appeal.

On zhihu.com, the Chinese equivalence of Quora, where enthusiasm about Trump is particularly strong, multiple top posts under the “Donald J. Trump” tag center around the theme of liberal hypocrisy and weakness. For a site that pride itself with informed discussions and a respect for expertise, the overall hostility towards Western liberal ideas deserves a moment of reflection. One of the posts that garners more than 18,000 likes is a broad stroke thesis about the decline of Western civilization under the pressure of Muslim immigration. “There are towns in Britain that are completely under the control of Muslim extremists, who are openly using white girls as sex slaves under the eyes of gutless British policemen. Trump was right when he said there were no-go zones for French policemen in their own country. Western countries are in such a degree of self-deception that politicians like Obama and Merkel can be praised for their appeasement with Islamists while political correctness deters people from talking about the existential threat to Western civilization.”

It is one thing to be critical of the liberal ideas of multiculturalism and freedom of religion, it is quite another when a Chinese shows that level of concern for the demise of the West. Granted, ethnic strife is on the rise between Han Chinese and their Muslim compatriots. This could be part of the reason why some are anxious about a perceived Muslim advancement in other parts of the world. Another factor that might have played into this is the admire-despise complex that many in China harbor about the West. Deep down they still see the West as something to aspire to, and they feel frustrated when “weak” liberal leaders squander their full hand of good cards. “Angry about them not putting up a fight” (怒其不争), as one Chinese saying goes.

What’s more likely to have happened, though, is that somehow right-wing materials from the English-speaking world find their way into China through the Internet. After all, who is more troubled by the fall of (white) Western civilization than the American and European alt-right? This has happened before when, during last year’s European refugee crisis, a viral post on a Chinese website about how Japan “wisely” excludes Muslims from its society turned out to be translated from an openly anti-Muslim Zionist. In this year’s election cycle, conservative websites such as RedState, are used by Chinese media as authoritative sources of news. All kinds of conspiracy theories about Clinton, from pedophile allegations to murder charges, spread widely on people’s WeChat walls, reinforcing the image of her as a conniving, evil politician who embodies the hypocrisy of liberal politics.

In a way, the Chinese Internet is just an extension of what goes on in America this election season. The spectacular failure of mainstream US media to sway public opinion and to foresee a Trump win is a sign of the social media’s unprecedented efficacy in channeling information and aligning the electorates, bypassing established gatekeeping and blindsiding political operations based on rules of the past era. The new landscape enables players such as Wikileaks to reach millions of voters unfiltered, and makes spinning through “surrogates” less effective. Chinese netizens have long harbored a suspicion about the “Western media”, seen as being biased against China. The disorderly situation in the US provides an even larger incentive to look beyond what the NYT or Washington Post is saying. On Zhihu, users pile on Podesta’s leaked emails and develop their own theory of top Democratic officials involving in unspeakably diabolic child abuse. Their ability to consume such materials “uncensored” by mainstream Western media leads some Chinese netizens to consider themselves more informed about the candidates than the Americans.

When those smart Chinese internet users climb over the imagined informational barriers erected by Western media, they are thrilled to find a Trump that speaks to their beliefs. A great many commentators point to the so-called pragmatism in Trump as what resonates with Chinese watchers. Some of them even half-jokingly compare him to Deng Xiaoping, the great Communist leader who opened China to the outside world after Mao’s death. Deng famously declared that “a cat is a good cat if it catches rats, no matter whether its black or white.” The metaphor was advanced to settle heated ideological debates that threatened to thwart his reform to liberalize the market. To many Chinese, “political correctness” is equivalent to socialist dogmas that should be swept aside when addressing the West’s “real” problems. If illegal immigrants or refugees cause social upheavals, say it. That’s the logic for those who believe that Germany’s welcome of refugees, or America’s embrace of immigrants are due to political constraints that prevent them from doing otherwise, much as China’s own communist dogma prohibited the embrace of private enterprises 40 years ago. Breaking the shackles created by naive, holier-than-thou liberals is an act of dogma-shattering pragmatism, seen from the historical experience of modern China.

One Zhihu user offers a more personal explanation why many Chinese seem able to relate to the kind of anxiety that Trump claims to represent. The Chinese white collar class, as the author puts it, is not very far removed from their working-class roots. “Most Chinese born after the 1980s are from a working-class background, who can still sympathize with the uneducated ignorance demonstrated by the less refined and appreciate its political power when mobilized. It is what their parents, uncles and primary school classmates look like.”  Their modest roots make them less repelled by Trump than their “elitist” liberal counterparts in the US. Of course, the stereotype of liberal elites in a Chinese mind, invariably based on some version of an east coast intellectual or a Silicon Valley executive, is more imagination than reality, willfully ignoring the millions of Americans who vote Democrat and who are no less modest in their background than the author’s “Chinese parents”.

There is, nevertheless, a much blunter assessment of why well-educated Chinese love Trump. Zhao Lingmin, a columnist for the Chinese website of the Financial Times, also links it with their upbringing. However, in contrast to the rosy idea that their generational experience with hardship makes it easier for them to relate to their poorer countrymen, Zhao believes that 30 years of unbridled economic growth “without much moral or legal constraints” has enshrined social Darwinism as the guiding doctrine for much of the Chinese society. The widespread worship of winners and contempt of losers prevent the society from developing any “political correctness” that shields disadvantaged communities such as women and the disabled from abuses by those with wealth and power. “Over time, those who master the rules of this winner-takes-all environment have developed a hardened heart and a high self-regard.” They are convinced that those left behind must have something deplorable and are alarmed by any welfare program aiming to lift them up. Trump’s message is a loud confirmation of this value system.

Disgusted by what he has witnessed in Chinese debates about the election, “Pretend to live in NYC”(假装在纽约), a personality on Weibo well known for his effort to introduce progressive message abroad to the Chinese cyberspace, brands Chinese Trump supporters as “spiritual rednecks“, ethnic Chinese who identify with a Texan bigot. They look down upon other people of color, but insist, ironically, that whites should not discriminate against Chinese, a political correctness they’d rather preserve.

Trump’s true Chinese supporter might sit somewhere between the two ends marked by the views above. He is probably not the “son of a working man” whose innate compassion connects him with the suffering of his poor compatriots. He is also not entirely the cold-blooded, prototype social Darwinist who cares only about self-achievement at the expense of others. After the election, a widely-read Weibo post (again originated from Zhihu) summarizes what Trump’s win has “taught China”, generating tens of thousands of retweets.

“1. We should retain our college entrance exam system that ensures a pathway for poor kids to move up the social ladder. The American election shows how a lack of upward mobility tears apart the society;

2. China should protect its manufacturing sector and prevent it from being outsourced. America’s deindustrialization only benefits capitalists, not workers;

3. China should forcefully resist immigrants and reject political correctness. Illegal immigrants usually compete with lower working class people for jobs, not professional middle class. When the daily safety of working class residents is threatened, they should be able to protect themselves without fear of being politically incorrect. 

4. China should be adamantly against excessive care for the LGBT community. Their values and choice should be tolerated, not advocated, especially not at the expense of suppressed mainstream values.

Who would have imagined that a US election can inspire China to come up with what seems like its own conservative manifesto, a strange combination of care for social equality and dismiss of cultural inclusiveness. Through the dizzying image of a triumphant Trump, the Chinese society discovers its funny and distorted reflection, as if inside a funhouse.

7 thoughts on “People’s Republic of Spiritual Rednecks

  1. A tour de force. Easily the most insightful piece about the phenomenon of Chinese Trump support I have yet read or heard. Bravo!

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  2. sounds like those ugly Golden Dreamers raising their ugly heads! Biggest group in China

    Hope you are well cheers C

    On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 12:11 AM, Chublic Opinion wrote:

    > mtj828 posted: ” “Trump wins!” At 1pm, November 9, Beijing time, hours > before mainstream US media could confidently call the 2016 US presidential > election for Trump, eager Chinese spectators handed Trump the presidency > using what seems like a photoshopped screenshot of ” >

    Like

  3. > Who would have imagined that a US election can inspire China to come up with what seems like its own conservative manifesto, a strange combination of care for social equality and dismiss of cultural inclusiveness.

    The author makes a basic mistake here by stating that this is a “strange” ideological combination. There is nothing strange about this at all, the Trump election merely allowed more Chinese to reiterate what they already fundamentally believed in anyways, and these beliefs are definitely not inspired by the US election. What is so strange about the four points? 1) Isn’t the keju an attempt for fair entrance exam to allow the lower classes to move up if they had the skills? It might not work perfectly in practice but the idea that there should be social movement was always there even in ancient China. 2) Confucianism always dictated that the “normal people” (civilians, peasants, laobaixing etc.) should be taken care off and the empire should be thought of as one extended family. If this is the case, why shouldn’t normal workers whose jobs are always in danger of disappearing be taken care off? Again, China has a history of terrible empires and terrible dynasties, but this fundamental idea that the emperor should take care of the empire and by extension all the people he rules always existed. 3) It could be argued that China never had a culture of cultural inclusiveness, and therefore there is no reason that Chinese people will suddenly start having it now. 4) At the end of the day, more conservative societies will always be against homosexuality on some level. It can be tolerated because it is not one’s fault how one’s genes function, but advocacy is a different matter than tolerating. This can be seen in Singapore. There isn’t really any persecution of homosexuality, but I doubt there will be any chance of it becoming legalized.

    I am not saying I fundamentally agree with any of the above points and I am not arguing whether they are correct or not. My point is that a people’s deeply held cultural convictions that evolved over millennias will stay with them. The US election did not inspire anything, it merely reaffirmed the Chinese worldview that have existed for centuries if not millennias.

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    • 1) The quota system that artificially adjusts exam scores up or down depending on one’s economic background, giving preferential treatment to students in the big cities, would seem to invalidate any view that the college entrance exam is even remotely fair, just as the ancient jinshi examination system ultimately favoured the sons of the wealthy and powerful. 2) Socialism with Chinese characteristics is not merely Confucianism with a red star tacked on, and has elevated values such as loyalty to the Party far ahead of the moral duty a classical Confucian would feel to speak truth to power, which means that the Emperor no longer needs to worry about all the people – only his base, just as it is in America. Talk to a laid off steelworker in Jilin or a homeless former miner in Shanxi about elite support for working people. 3) It doesn’t need to be argued – it’s blatantly true, and persecution of minority populations is an ongoing historical theme in China, and across the world. However, official rhetoric champions inclusiveness and ‘one China’ thinking, and if the popular view continues to chafe against this, another Boxer or Taiping rebellion is far from impossible, an issue I doubt the authorities are unaware of. 4) Patently untrue – homosexuality has been tolerated with varying degrees of openness throughout Chinese history barring a few aberrant and short-lived periods of semi-criminalisation, and has never been illegal in the modern era (making ‘legalisation’ a moot point). The move towards acceptance of LGBT individuals in many Asian cultures (Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Japan and, crucially, Taiwan, which is on the cusp of legalising same-sex civil unions) shows that increased LGBT visibility is slowly changing attitudes. Holding up examples like Singapore (authoritarian government subject to intense pressure from evangelical and Islamic lobbies) isn’t reflective of the overall picture, which is spotty and has more to do with prevailing religious views than sociocultural ones.

      I appreciate that many of the points you list are taken as gospel, but in fact China’s ‘values’ have been in flux for millennia, varying dynasty to dynasty and emperor to emperor (look at the alternating persecution and championing of Buddhism, for example). Chinese people are as adaptable to political and social change as any population – perhaps more so given the upheaval most have lived through since 1949. The author is making a valid point about the appeal of nationalism and perceived ‘strength’ embodied by a man like Trump in a country like China, where plenty of people admire such qualities. Many admire Clinton for embodying the same qualities. I agree with your point that there isn’t necessarily a contradiction in many Chinese finding Trump appealing, but to follow this sensible observation with generalisations about the ‘Chinese worldview’ turns a nation of 1.3bn thinking individuals into a bunch of hive-minded worker ants.

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      • 1) You clearly missed my point. My point is that there is a fundamental belief among people that there should be a fair meritocratic method for people to move up in society, not that the system is perfect. In fact, I quite clearly stated the system isn’t perfect in my original post. You stating that the college entrance exam isn’t fair does not relate to my original point at all. 2) No one believes in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and it is frankly irrelevant to my point. I can say the Confucianist scholar officials of each dynasty elevated values such as loyalty to the dynasty far ahead of any “traditional” Confucian values. They do this for singular political purposes *but this does not change the fact that in general, people still believe in Confucian values*. The person who wrote the Zhihu post is some random guy on Zhihu. The agenda he’s sprouting is in line with Confucianist thought, not Socialism with Chinese Characteristics which no one takes seriously anyways. You say CPC do not care about workers in Jilin because its political ideology only dictates it take care of its base, but many Chinese emperors didn’t care about peasants either. All dynastic infighting end up less to do with values of Confucianism than simple Machiavellian plotting over power. *But the general belief that the emperor should care for the general population because the empire is an extended family survives among the population*. The Zhihu post is popular among the general population, and we can use this as a proxy for the general belief of the population. Sure, Zhihu is a very skewed and limited sample of the population, but it is a proxy for belief nonetheless. You miss my key point again. 3) Championing inclusiveness is a purely pointless propaganda exercise. No one believes in it. Not the population, not the government. Both the government and the population are quite happy with excluding foreign cultures on some level. I don’t see how the Taiping Rebellion relates to this at all. One China Policy is to do with geopolitics with Taiwan, not cultural policy. 4) Tolerating it and legalizing it is two separate issues. Tolerating homosexuality and legalizing same sex marriage *are clearly two separate issues*, so legalization definitely isn’t a moot point. Taiwan is on the cusp of same sex marriage. Where else in Asia is?

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  4. I am in a WeChat group with 180+ 华人 in Nashville, TN. All election they have been so pro-Trump is has disgusted by me. I would love to post of screenshot of the original Chinese article by “Pretend to be in NY”, but they would boot me.

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